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Abstract
This study explores the impact of different ownership types on the efficiency of water utilities. The-
ories and evidence have shown a puzzling relationship between ownership and performance. More-
over, relatively recent contributions (Andrews et al., 2011) have argued that this relationship can be
further convoluted by the effect of organisational and environmental variables. The current study
aims to contribute to this literature by providing some empirical evidence for Italy, by proposing a
methodology that combines nonparametric efficiency estimation and cluster analysis. Our main find-
ings indicate that privately owned utilities indirectly controlled by a public organisation reach the
highest level of efficiency but, when size and geographical location enter the analysis, ownership has
a stronger significant effect on efficiency, and mixed utilities gain higher cost efficiency. Therefore,
we may conclude that administrative reforms about privatisation and the institutional setting should
consider a set of variables that characterise each individual organisation.
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1. INTRODUCTION
In recent decades waves of administrative reforms have been implemented to improve local
public services performance and cope with increasing constraints on financial resources. In
this scenario, devolution and changes in ownership structure have occurred as a solution to
public sector inefficiencies (Guy et al., 1996; Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011; Savas, 2000; Shaw and
Munday, 1999). Several scholars have investigated whether and how ownership affects perfor-
mance, in order to find the most efficient, effective and fair way to deliver public services. The
persistence of this issue in the literature can be motivated by different theoretical perspectives,
puzzling empirical results and the acknowledgement that the link between ownership and per-
formance is further complicated by the existence of ‘moderators’ such as organisational and
environmental characteristics of the services provided (Andrews et al., 2011).
The extent of the debate about the ownership of public service production has been exac-
erbated by a wide acceptance of neo-liberal and New Public Management policies (Osborne
and Gaebler, 1992; Hood, 1991) rooted in the Public Choice theory (Niskanen, 1971). Accord-
ing to this perspective, competition represents a solution to overcome public overproduction
and inefficiency. Therefore it is assumed that governments, at any level, should privatise and
contract-out services in order to achieve technical and cost efficiency. Ultimately this process
would shift the ownership of service providers from the public to the private sector.
Along with Public Choice theory, other theoretical perspectives have dealt with issues re-
garding service delivery choices. First, Williamson (1979, 1999) suggests that transactions cost
and monitoring can play an important role in the choice to externalise services. In particu-
lar, this approach suggests that when transaction costs are low, privatisation can lead to cost
savings. Second, property rights theory (Demsetz, 1967) advocates that private ownership can
lead to higher performance, due to better defined property rights and incentives to monitor and
control the managers’ behaviour. Third, the theory of incomplete contracts (Hart and Moore,
1990) suggests that privatisation could reduce costs, but without an adequate incentive sys-
tem, it can also lower services’ quality. In recent years several studies, such as Bel and Fageda
(2010), Warner and Hefetz (2008), and Bel et al. (2014), among others, have highlighted the
popularity of alternative ownership structures that combine public and private capital—such
as mixed companies and public-private partnerships. Therefore these new types of organisa-
tions can challenge even more the relationship between ownership and performance (Vining
and Weimer, ming).
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Empirical evidence on the relationship between ownership and performance has been re-
viewed by recent studies, such as Andrews et al. (2011) and Bel et al. (2010). Andrews et al.
(2011) review thirty-one studies examine the link between ‘publicness’(Bozeman, 1987) and
performance in a wide range of public services. Bel et al. (2010) conduct meta-analysis of
twenty-seven studies comparing the costs of public and private production in solid waste ser-
vices and water distribution. Both of these extensive reviews reveal that there is no systematic
evidence supporting the superiority of either public or private production for delivering public
services. These studies suggest that performance and efficiency seems to be affected by other
factors apart from ownership, such as transaction costs, economies of scale, regulation, gover-
nance, or the environment. Andrews et al. (2011) refer to these factors as ‘moderators’ of the
relationship between ownership and performance.
In light of the literature, this study investigates whether ownership structure has a signifi-
cant effect on the cost efficiency of water service utilities when ‘moderators’ such as size and
geographical features are simultaneously considered. The empirical evidence is based on a
sample of Italian water utilities from 2008 to 2011.
In this regard, Italy represents an ideal geographical case study given a highly heterogene-
ity in the ownership structures, size and environmental features of the water utilities operating
in this country. Moreover, attention to Italian water utilities can be further motivated by three
main reasons. First, in recent years the Italian water industry has been at the centre of a debate
about the possibility of liberalisation (Massarutto et al., 2008). Second, in 2011 the legisla-
tor modified the multilevel governance of the industry by abolishing the so-called “Autorità
d’Ambito Ottimale”(“optimal area authority”), more popularly known by their initials, ATOs,
in charge of coordinating the service at territorial level. However the current regulation has not
yet determined which existing or new authorities are to take their place. Third, it is claimed
that the price of water in Italy is one of the cheapest in Europe, but research results find that
this is not sustainable in the long term (Utilitatis, 2011). In this context, efficiency is a neces-
sary condition to guarantee this vital service in a fair and equal manner. The same concern is
shared with previous studies carried out for other European countries, such as Spain and Por-
tugal (González-Gómez et al., 2013; Da Cruz et al., 2012). Therefore the current study attempts
to provide empirical results that can help policy makers and local governments in countries
where the implementation of administrative reforms on ownership structure need to be made
in a changing institutional environment and the pressure to provide a fair price for public
services is high.
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The method applied in this paper combines two well-known nonparametric efficiency
estimators—namely, Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA, Charnes et al., 1978) —with cluster
analysis, following O’Donnell et al. (2008) and Balaguer-Coll et al. (2013). The advantage of
using DEA is to rank water utilities on the basis of their efficiency score without requiring any
assumption on the distribution function of the data (Rao et al., 2005). Moreover, by applying
statistical clustering techniques the study controls for the effect of the ‘moderators’, which has
not been carried out in previous studies.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 provide a brief overview of the studies
regarding the efficiency of water utilities. Section 3 describes the regulatory framework of the
Italian water supply service. Section 4 provides an explanation of the method and data. Section
5 reports the results and Section 6 concludes the paper.
2. REVIEW OF THE RELEVANT LITERATURE
Since the early 1970s, several studies have assessed the effect of ownership on water supply
service (WSS) efficiency. These studies differ in several respects, including the method used
to measure their efficiency levels. In particular, two groups of studies can be identified: those
using accounting methods, and those applying econometrics and operational research meth-
ods. The current study applies an operational research method, namely DEA, to estimate WSS
utility efficiency. As pointed out by Bogetoft and Otto (2011), the selection of a benchmark-
ing approach should ‘reflect and respect the characteristics of the industry’. With particular
reference to the WSS, Berg and Marques (2011) argue that the lack of knowledge on the pro-
duction function in this industry can justify the application of DEA. This method is considered
more flexible than parametric approaches, since it does not require any assumption on the
distribution function of the data. Moreover, Bogetoft (1994) highlighted the incentive-efficient
properties of DEA that can be applied by regulators as it can be seen in England and Wales
(Thanassoulis, 2000a,b).
The first study to apply the concept of Farrell (1957) efficiency—on which DEA is based—in
this particular context was Byrnes et al. (1986), in an analysis focused on the US. The theoretical
perspective on which the study was grounded provided arguments that privately-owned firms
were more efficient than their publicly-owned counterparts. However, the nonparametric tests
reveal no evidence that the latter utilities were ‘more wasteful or operated with more slack
than privately owned utilities’ (Byrnes et al., 1986, p.341). Following and ‘adjusting’ Byrnes
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et al.’s (1986) method, several studies have applied DEA to analyse the relationship between
ownership and water services’ efficiency around the world. In line with the purpose of current
study, the following review briefly outlines the research on the effect of ownership on WSS
utility efficiency, classifying the studies into three groups according to their results: (i) studies
that reported no influence of ownership on efficiency; (ii) studies finding that public ownership
improves efficiency; and (iii) those finding better efficiency scores for privately owned utilities.
One of the most relevant contributions among the first group of studies would include
Byrnes et al. (1986). More recent research includes García-Sánchez (2006), who measures the
technical and scale efficiency of Spanish municipalities, distinguishing between those which
externalised the water services to privately owned utilities and those which provide the service
through public business corporations. The study claims that, in the specific context analysed,
the creation of a quasi-market does not seem to affect efficiency. The author suggests that this
result can be justified by the fact that the creation of public business corporations relieves the
management of the business from the traditional public sector bureaucratic procedures. In
this group of studies we also find Peda et al. (2013) who, in an application to Estonian water
service utilities, found ‘no difference in efficiency between water utilities with different types
of ownership’. Their study also found a positive relationship between population size and
efficiency, corroborating the hypothesis that efficiency gains are attributable to scale economies.
In the second group of studies, one of the most relevant contributions is the one by Romano
and Guerrini (2011) on the efficiency of Italian water utilities. To the best of our knowledge, this
is the first study to apply DEA to Italian water utilities, finding that publicly-owned utilities
obtain higher efficiencies than mixed-owned. The authors interpret these results as an indica-
tion that publicly-owned utilities are better able to acquire and use their inputs. Moreover, the
study considers the effect of size and geographical location on the performance of the water
utilities. The results show the existence of economies of scale, since larger companies perform
better. Regarding the geographical location issue, utilities located in Central and Southern
Italy are more efficient than those operating in the north—although the differences were not
statistically significant.
Finally, the third group of studies find superior performance in privately-owned utility
firms. Specifically, Picazo-Tadeo et al. (2009) find that privately-owned utilities are more ef-
ficient than their publicly-owned counterparts. The authors claim that this result is due to
efficiency in the use of labour, pointing out that the influence of trade unions makes it difficult
to adjust the number of employees. González-Gómez et al. (2013), focusing on Spain’s rural
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areas, find that both privately-owned utilities and public-private partnerships are significantly
more efficient. Notably, the differences in term of efficiency between the three forms of owner-
ship disappear when environmental variables are considered. As environmental variables the
authors suggest the existence of economies of consumer density, the origin of water resources
and the seasonality of demand. These are factors that can influence the efficiency but they do
not depend on ownership structure. The authors concludes that public-owned utilities oper-
ate in a more challenging environment while private utilities avoid it due to low profitability
expectations. The authors remark that public-private owned utilities do not perform badly in
comparison with the other two kinds of utility ownership.
The available empirical evidence suggests that the debate on the links between ownership
and performance is still unsettled. In addition, other variables also seem to be relevant in as-
sessing performance and institutional choices. Firstly, the efficiency of water supply services
can be related to their size, as the law of economies of scale would predict, however previous
literature also suggests that economies of scale occur only after reaching certain level of output
(Walter et al., 2009). Secondly, some studies highlight the effect of regulatory framework and in-
centive mechanisms on performance. González-Gómez and García-Rubio (2008) highlight that
the greater efficiency observed for the private utilities could result from either the ownership
features themselves or the regulatory framework within the industry. De Witte and Marques
(2010) present a cross-country comparison examining the role of incentive mechanisms in re-
lation to efficiency levels. The results show a positive effect of incentive mechanisms (such as
benchmarking) on efficiency. On the basis of these results, the authors conclude that bench-
marking could become a tool to create ‘competition by comparison’ in contrast to ‘competition
in the market’ or ‘competition for the market’. The importance of regulation, the creation of
independent authorities to control the conduct of water utilities and benchmarking initiatives
are also highlighted in recent research by Bel et al. (2015). This paper suggests these factors are
essential in ensuring a fair water price, especially with respect to privatised utilities. Finally,
efficiency can be affected by environmental variables, such the hydrographical characteristics
of the geographical area in which the utilities are located (Martins et al., 2012).
The current research therefore attempts to contribute to this literature by investigating the
effect of three variables, namely: ownership types, size and geographical location. These three
variables are considered separately in the first stage of analysis and by combining their effects
in the subsequent stage. This could shed light on the contribution of different ownership
structures to assist in mitigating exogenous conditions such as hydrographical characteristics
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and aid in strategic planning on utilities size.
3. WATER SERVICE IN ITALY
Water supply services (WSS) are generally considered public services provided through a net-
work regulated by public authorities, therefore any speculation on the organisation, governance
and performance is strongly affected by the regulatory framework within each country. The
Italian WSS are regulated by four hierarchical levels of jurisdiction: the European Union, the
central government, the regional governments, and the local governments.
European legislation classifies water supply services as a ‘service of general economic in-
terest’ (European Community Treaty, Article 86(2)). Therefore WSS are economic services that
have to be provided to every citizen on a regular basis and at affordable prices, regardless of
the ownership of the service provider. Moreover, in 2000 the European Commission issued the
Water Framework Directive (WFD), addressing most of the challenges facing the management
of this crucial resource. Two of the innovations introduced by the WFD were the cost recovery
for water services and the ‘polluter-pays’ principles. These principles aim to create incentives
for the sustainable and efficient use of water.
As highlighted in the previous section, the last decades have witnessed changes in the own-
ership of public service providers. The European Commission lets each Member State decide
how it organises the provision of a service of general economic interest so long as the rules on
both the internal market and competition are observed. As a result, different approaches to the
organisation of WSS can be found among EU Member States. For instance, in The Netherlands
and Germany, municipal public enterprises provide water services. Conversely, in England and
Wales the service was totally privatised and a regulatory authority established (Bauby, 2012).
In Italy, water supply services were traditionally provided by municipalities. In this context,
the service was financed via public budget, and the tariff was usually insufficient to cover the
costs (Massarutto et al., 2008). In order to improve the efficiency of the industry, the Law 196/94
was enacted in 1994 to reform the industry. First, the reform recognised the network features
of the WSS and introduced the concept of ‘integrated water service’, considering the whole
water supply and sewage system. Second, the reform reorganised the WSS by introducing
territorial authorities, ATOs, with the aim of exploiting economies of scale in the management
of services. Regions were in charge of identifying these ATOs and municipalities could own
equity shares in ATOs. About 90 ATOs were identified according to the political-administrative
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and hydrographical features of each area (Utilitatis, 2011). The main function assigned to the
ATOs was to draw up a management plan for the WSS and to designate the WSS provider.
In the mid-2000s, Law 196/94 was replaced by the Environmental Code (Decree 152/2006),
which retained the two main innovations of the previous law and introduced the European
principle of cost recovery for the WSS. Among other norms, article 154 of the Environmental
Code stated that the WSS price had to guarantee remuneration for the capital invested.
Meanwhile, changes had occurred in the institutional organisation of service providers.
Since 1990, inspired by New Public Management, a series of reforms have been introduced to
promote externalisation of local public services. The result is that the WSS provider could be
a municipality, a municipal corporation, a mixed enterprise or a private entity. Moreover some
municipalities have created municipal holdings that invested in private entity providing public
service (Grossi and Mussari, 2009), therefore private entities can have a municipality as indirect
shareholder.
Finally, water supply services were also affected by a series of relatively recent events.
First, the financial crisis forced governments to cut their budgets. In this context, the Italian
legislator suggested eliminating the ATOs by the end of 2011. However, this regulation did not
determine which authority should replace the ATOs, a question that still remains unanswered.
Second, in 2011 a referendum repealed article 23-bis of Law 113/2008 and article 154 of the
Environmental Code. Subsequently, the appointment of the WSS is based only on European
legislation, with the result that the service can be provided by municipalities directly, in house,
by mixed enterprises without any specification of the percentage that must be owned by private
partners, or by privately owned enterprises. A further consequence of the referendum was that
the tariff should not be set according to the return on capital invested.
In conclusion, it can be argued that the main consequences of reforms and counter-reforms
of the water supply services are: (i) a multilevel governance structure of the industry, although
the levels of this structure are still uncertain regarding the replacement of the ATOs and the
role of the regions; and (ii) in the absence of an intermediate authority such as the ATOs, it
seems that municipalities could once again be free to choose the delivery mode and appoint the
service provider as they did in the past; (iii) changes in the tariff computation, with particular
regard to the return on capital invested.
7
4. METHODS AND DATA
Our study investigates the effect of ownership and the ‘moderators’, i.e., size and geographical
location, on the cost efficiency of Italian water utilities. To this end a three-stage methodol-
ogy is applied: (i) we measure cost efficiency using a nonparametric estimators, namely, Data
Envelopment Analysis (DEA); (ii) cluster analysis, building groups based on ownership, size
and geographical allocation of the organisations; and (iii) testing for differences in the efficien-
cies in each group and each cluster—i.e., nonparametric test is applied to verify whether type
of ownership, size, geographical location, or their combination in clusters result in significant
efficiency differences.
This methodological approach is similar to the one considered by Balaguer-Coll et al. (2013)
in studying the efficiency of Spanish municipalities. However it differs from previous relevant
work on water utilities, such as (Peda et al., 2013; Romano and Guerrini, 2011), who considered
an a priori classification of organizations, without considering the combined effect on perfor-
mance. Therefore, the procedure carried out in this study allowed the definition of clusters
ex-post instead of ex-ante identifying a combination of factors that can influence cost efficiency
and controlling for heterogeneity.
For measuring cost efficiency we consider Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA). Its origins
date back to Farrell’s (1957) approach to frontier estimation, although it was not until 1978 that
the term was first used (Charnes et al., 1978). Since then, this method has become one of the
most popular techniques for benchmarking, with applications from financial firms to public
service utilities—including water utilities (Fethi and Pasiouras, 2010).
DEA is a mathematical programming technique for the estimation of the best production
frontier (or envelopment) and the measurement of the relative efficiency of different organisa-
tions (Bogetoft and Otto, 2011). This approach assigns a score between 0 and 1 to each decision
making unit (in the case that an input orientation and Farrell distance functions are consid-
ered), allowing the organisations to be ranked on the basis of an increasing efficiency order.
The term ‘frontier’ identifies the most efficient organisation that satisfies either the input or
output-based Farrell efficiency condition.
In this study, efficiency measures are computed on the basis of two assumptions. Firstly
efficiency scores are input-based and thus measure the level of input to obtain a given amount
of output 1. Secondly inputs are expressed in monetary terms allowing the measurement of
1As indicated by Rao et al. (2005), the input-oriented efficiency addresses the question: ‘By how much can input
quantities be proportionally reduced without changing the output quantities produced?’ (Rao et al., 2005, p.137).
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cost efficiency.
Formally, the input-oriented DEA is based on the solution of the following linear program-
ming problem (Rao et al., 2005; Coelli and Walding, 2006):
minθ,λ θ
s.t.
yi + Yλ ≥ 0,
θxi − Xλ ≥ 0,
N1′λ = 1,
λ ≥ 0.
(1)
where:
• yi is an M× 1 vector of outputs produced by the ith firm,
• Y is the M× N matrix of outputs of the N firms in the sample,
• X is the K × N matrix of inputs of the N firms,
• λ is an N × 1 vector of weights (which relate to the peer firms) and θ is a scalar measure
of efficiency, which takes a value between 0 and 1 (inclusive).
Further details on this approach are also available in Balaguer-Coll et al. (2007), among
others, who propose a very similar program to the one followed in this paper. For a more
comprehensive view, see also Cooper et al. (2007) and Färe et al. (1994).
4.1. Testing for the equality of distributions of efficiency scores
In the second stage of the analysis we try to ascertain whether the differences found among
the efficiency scores of the firms in each group are statistically different or not. In this regard,
a variety of instruments can be considered to test whether the differences between some of the
moments that characterise two given distributions differ statistically. Some of these instruments
are tests, such as the Wilcoxon test, which have the advantage of being relatively robust to the
violation of the normality assumption but have the limitation of restraining the analysis to one
moment of the distribution only (in our case, the distribution of efficiency scores), namely the
This approach seems particularly suitable for the context of the water industry, where utilities are more able to
control their inputs rather than their outputs—such as water delivery and population served (Abbott and Cohen,
2009; Coelli and Walding, 2006; Romano and Guerrini, 2011).
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median. However, some recent applications (Balaguer-Coll et al., 2010) have considered some
tools developed in the field of nonparametric statistics such as the Li (1996) test, which tests
whether two distributions, not just two summary statistics such as the mean or the median,
differ statistically.
4.2. The sample
As stated above, the empirical evidence presented in this paper focuses on a sample of water
utilities operating in Italy from 2008 to 2011. A complete list of Italian water utilities was
obtained from Federutilities, an Italian association of public services provider.2 However, the
sample is restricted to mono-service utilities with available data and stable ownership structure.
Therefore, only utilities for which the percentage of ownership has not changed from 2008 to
2011 are included in the analysis. The final sample is comprised of 68 utilities in each of the
four years analysed, leading to 272 observations across the four years study (Table 1). The 68
utilities represent 70% of those listed by Federutilities and they served about 45% of the Italian
population in 2011. Furthermore, utilities are classified according to three variables: ownership
structure, size and geographical location.
As highlighted in the previous section, a water supply service provider could be a munici-
pality, a municipal corporation, a municipal holding, a mixed enterprise or a private entity. In
this scenario, our study focuses on water services which are externalised by the local govern-
ment through a separate entity, namely an utility, with a different type of ownership structure.
In our particular sample, five types of ownership were identified (Table 1). As demonstrated
above, the conventional classification of private, public and mixed ownership used by previous
research (Guerrini et al., 2011) does not fully reflect the complexity of the Italian context or
any other national setting where many alternative modes to delivery public services coexist
(Tavares and Camöes, 2007; Bel and Fageda, 2010). In addition to the utility ownership models
of publicly owned (type 1) and privately owned (type 2), this research distinguishes between
two specific groupings within mixed utilities. The first of these groups are utilities which have
a public organisation as the controlling shareholder (type 3) and, the second group are utilities
which have a private organisation as the controlling shareholder (type 4). Finally, we define a
separate category of private utilities in which the indirect main shareholder is a public organi-
sation (type 5). As reported in 1 32 utilities (128 observations over four years), corresponding to
47% of the sample, are publicly owned. The remaining utilities are primarily spread between
2In 2015 Federutilities was merged in Utilitalia.
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types 2 and 3. Only three utilities were classified as type 4 and six were classified as type 5.
The size of water utilities is usually measured considering the population served, however,
due to a lack of data over the time span analysed, a proxy was used in this study. A possible
proxy is total revenue, obtained from utilities’ financial statements. This variable shows a
strong linear correlation with the population served (92%), suggesting that revenue can be
used as proxy of the population served with confidence. Table 1 shows that the sample is
mainly characterised in small and medium size utilities, only three are considered to be large.
Finally, the third variable considered is geographical location. Most of the utilities in the
sample are situated in the Northern of Italy, while 15% and 28% are in the Centre and Southern
regions, respectively (Table 1). Italy is characterised by heterogeneous hydrographical features
which can affect efficiency levels. Northern and Southern regions, saving a few exceptions, are
characterized by surface waters that require a more sophisticated purification process, leading
to higher operational and capital costs (Istat, 2008, 2014).
Utilities are further classified using cluster analysis in an the attempt to maximise the ho-
mogeneity of units within the clusters while maximising the heterogeneity among clusters. In
the current analysis, five clusters are identified. The characteristics of these clasters are shown
in Table 2 with their associated descriptions shown in Table 3. All variables were shown to
be significant with regard to all clusters, with the exception of the fourth type of ownership -
mixed owned utilities with a private organisation that owns 50% or more. The cluster analy-
sis discriminates between medium size, publicly owned utilities in central and Southern Italy
(Cluster 1) and those that are located in the north of the country (Cluster 3). Cluster 2 contains
both mixed and privately owned utilities however in both cases, the cluster analysis identifies
the main direct or indirect shareholder as a public organisation and but does not discriminate
between size and geographical location. Cluster 4 is characterised primarily by small sized,
privately owned utilities located in Southern Italy. Finally, Cluster 5 aggregates primarily small
sized, publicly owned and mixed owned utilities in Northern Italy.
Since we are using a data panel of 68 utilities from 2008 to 2011, a window analysis could
also have been considered. However, we consider the approach used in this paper is appropri-
ate due to the low likelihood of technical change in the short term in the context of the urban
water sector.
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4.3. Inputs and outputs
One of the biggest challenges in the application of DEA was the selection of the input-output
variables suitable and available for water utilities. Consistently with the aim to estimate cost
efficiency scores, operational costs were used. Four operational costs were considered as inputs,
namely: cost of materials, cost of services, cost of using third party resources (such as rented
or leased plant and equipment), and wages.
The most popular measures of outputs are: the amount of water delivered, the population
served, and the length of water mains (Coelli and Walding, 2006). The above data are not
accessible for all the utilities in the sample and the population served is available only for 2011,
therefore revenue is used as a proxy for the variable size.
Furthermore, since the analysis is longitudinal and both inputs and outputs are expressed
in monetary terms, the data are deflated by the Italian consumer price index in order to correct
them for inflation (Coelli and Walding, 2006). This adjustment is particularly relevant, since
the time frame analysed is characterised by a considerable increase in prices (5.5%).
Finally, Table 4 reports the definition of inputs and outputs, and Table 5 their corresponding
descriptive statistics for each year under analysis. It is worthwhile noticing that skewness and
kurtosis are far from zero, the value that indicates the variables under analysis follow a normal
distribution.
5. RESULTS
5.1. DEA efficiencies
Efficiency scores for the utilities in the sample over the 4 years computed via DEA are reported
in Tables 6 and 7. The tables report DEA efficiencies considering the three classification criteria
both separately (Table 6) and jointly (Table 7).
When considering the ex-ante classifications (ownership, size, geographical location), re-
markable differences are perceived among groups within each of the hypotheses considered. In
the case of the groups constructed according to their ownership type, the discrepancies are par-
ticularly large. As indicated by the efficiency scores in Table 6, the discrepancies among average
efficiencies are quite large, ranging from 49.19% for the most inefficient group (privately-owned
utilities) to 90.42% for the least inefficient (privately-owned utilities with a public organisation
as the main indirect shareholder). Focusing on the median, in order to isolate the effects of
potential outliers, these discrepancies are even higher—the medians are 48.99% and 97.78% for
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these two groups, respectively.
When the ‘moderators’, i.e., size and geographical location, are considered separately, the
results vary depending on the hypothesis considered. Regarding size, large firms show com-
paratively higher values—58.33% of them are efficient (see Table 6), whereas small firms are
quite inefficient by comparison as only 17.97% of such firms are efficient and the median is
also quite low (29.30%). This finding is consistent with previous research that indicated the
existence of economies of scale in the water industry (Romano and Guerrini, 2011; Peda et al.,
2013). In addition to this, the number of efficient firms for small, medium and large firms is
17.97%, 36.36% and 58.33%, respectively, however this finding was partly to be expected given
the assumption of variable returns to scale and the fact that the number of large firms is lower
than the number of smaller firms.
The discrepancies are more modest when analysing results for groups based on their geo-
graphical location. The discrepancies among groups’ average efficiencies are much lower (Table
6), and the utilities in the centre of Italy are the least inefficient, a finding that concurs with
previous research (Romano and Guerrini, 2011).
5.2. The ‘moderators’
As indicated in the introduction, understanding the link between ownership and performance
may be particularly intricate due to the effects of ‘moderators’, among which Andrews et al.
(2011) highlight the role of size, geographical location, and governance. This study combines
these factors in a clusters to take into account their effect on efficiency.
The summary statistics for the efficiencies corresponding to the five groups identified by the
cluster analysis are reported in Table 7. The differences betare high, especially when compar-
ing the least inefficient groups 2 (mixed ownership with both direct and indirect main public
organisation as shareholder) and 3 (publicly owned, medium, in Northern Italy), with clusters
4 (privately owned, small, in Southern Italy) and 5 (publicly owned, small, in Southern Italy).
More specifically, the average efficiencies corresponding to groups 2 and 3 are particularly
high (81.29% and 86.26%, respectively), analogously to the values for the medians (93.99%
and 97.16%, respectively). In contrast, the behaviour is quite the opposite for clusters 4 and
5, whose medians are 52.78% and 24.93%, which suggests that the mix of privately owned
and small firms in Southern Italy may be particularly problematic in terms of efficiency. This
finding seems to emphasise the relevance of economies of scale and the importance of public
investment in the water industry, especially in areas where the purification process needs to be
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more intense, such as in the southern parts of the country.
5.3. Testing for the differences among WSS efficiency scores
The analysis in the above paragraphs is based on soley summary statistics and its statistical
precision is therefore limited. In this section the methods proposed in section 4.1 are applied to
test whether the differences among the efficiencies of firms in the groups formed according to
different criteria are significant or not. The method employed, as indicated in section 4.1, has
the interesting virtue that it does not compare summary statistics but entire distributions of ef-
ficiency, as well as being fully nonparametric (and, therefore, consistent with the nonparametric
DEA estimators).
This test compares the densities, estimated via kernel smoothing, for the unconditioned
and conditioned relative series of efficiencies, where the unconditioned relative efficiency se-
ries corresponds to each firm’s efficiency, divided by the average corresponding to all firms
(computed yearly), and the conditioned relative efficiency series corresponds to each firm’s
efficiency divided by its group average. This average will differ depending on the hypothesis
considered—ownership, size, geographical location or their combined effect.
The densities are displayed in Figure 1. The lines in each sub-figure correspond to the un-
conditioned (solid line) and conditioned (dashed lines) relative efficiency series. Regardless of
whether the series is unconditioned or conditioned, the amount of multi-modality is remark-
able, with pronounced modes well below the mean (which is 1, given we are dividing by the
mean). This suggests there are non-negligible pockets of inefficient behaviour which do not
vanish after controlling for our three factors—or their combined effects.
If the conditioning results in tighter densities and closer to the mean (i.e., unity), this would
indicate that the conditioning scheme considered is relevant, i.e., efficiencies for all utility firms
in the same group would be similar. This is only the case when conditioning for size and, to a
lesser extent, ownership, whereas the effect of geography is negligible as the densities almost
overlap. The combined effect (the ‘moderators’) shows the strongest effect, as densities shift
leftwards, approaching the mean (see Figure 1.d), corroborating the descriptive analysis carried
out in the previous section.
Li’s (1996) test provides statistical evidence to support this visual analysis. Results, shown
in Table 8, corroborate the analysis stemming from the visual inspection of the densities, since
differences are particularly significant when considering size alone, or the combined effect
of the three hypotheses. In contrast, geographical location the differences does not produce
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significant differences, whereas in the case of the type of ownership the effect is only significant
at the 5% significance level.
6. CONCLUSIONS
This paper foucuses on a key public service, water supply services, and purpose of this study
has been to analyse the influence of local public ownership on the efficiency of Italian water
utilities. The study was motivated by the puzzling relationship between the different types of
ownership and efficiency. In addition, the literature has identified a gap in understanding the
effect of ‘moderators’ on the performance of water supply services.
We have considered the case of Italy, where these services have traditionally been pro-
vided by local governments but changes in regulation and the acceptance of paradigms such
as New Public Management have resulted in such services being provided by different organi-
sations. The current study has gone beyond the conventional classification of three ownership
types (public, private and mixed), identifying five types of ownership and better reflecting the
complexity of public service organisation in Italy and other countries. In this context, the re-
lationship between types of ownership and efficiency is further involved due to the disparate
sizes and geographical locations of the utilities. Previous studies have considered the effect of
ownership type, geographical location and size in isolation, whereas this study explores the
combined effect of these three factors on efficiency simultaneously.
From a methodological point of view, it can be argued that cluster analysis and appropriate
nonparametric tests help to better discriminate among the different factors that can affect the
efficiency of water utilities. Specifically, we measure efficiency by applying Data Envelopment
Analysis and tests based on kernel smoothing to ascertain whether the differences between
the clusters were significant or not. Using these methods the current study has found statisti-
cally significant differences in efficiencies across ownership types. Even stronger results were
seen when considering groups based on size or the groups yielded by cluster analysis, which
combine all the three factors of ownership type, size and geographical characteristics.
Furthermore the results suggest that privately owned utilities which are indirectly con-
trolled by public organisations reach the highest level of efficiency when size and geographical
location are not considered. However, the combined effect of ownership, size and geographical
location has a stronger effect on efficiency. In this case, mixed-owned water utilities, in which
a public organisation has direct or indirect control, are those with the higher efficiency levels.
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Our results suggests that policy makers and regulators should carefully consider the intrin-
sic characteristics of each industry in order to achieve better performance for public services. In
particular, with respect to the water industry, both public-private partnerships and economies
of scale seem to be important aspects to take into consideration, particularly when evaluating
them simultaneously.
Finally, we draw attention to the need to broaden this line of research to improve the likely
implications for regulators and policy makers. Although ownership and efficiency are im-
portant dimensions which affect the ‘publicness’ and performance, a comprehensive analysis
would require to simultaneously consider the impact of ‘control’,‘funding’ and ‘change’ on ef-
ficiency, effectiveness and equity (Andrews et al., 2011; Bowles et al., 2005; Bozeman, 1987). In
a recent paper, (Bel et al., 2015) consider the effect of market concentrations on water service
prices. The paper point outs that economies of scale are usually positively associated with
efficiency, however the market has become highly concentrated and the lack of adequate reg-
ulation results in an increase of water prices. Such a situation is characterised by a trade-off
between efficiency and equity, underlining the need for further, more encompassing research.
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Table 1: Italian water service utilities, distribution according to ownership, size and geographical location
Ownership # # %
Publicly owned utilities (ownership type 1) 32 128 47%
Privately owned utilities (ownership type 2) 15 60 22%
Mixed owned utilities with public organisation that owns 50% or more (ownership type 3) 12 48 18%
Mixed owned utilities with private organisation that owns 50% or more (ownership type 4) 3 12 4%
Privately owned utilities with main a public organisation as indirect shareholder (ownership type 5) 6 24 9%
Total 68 272 100%
Size # # %
Small 32 128 47.1%
Medium 33 132 48.5%
Large 3 12 4.4%
Total 68 272 100%
Geographical Location # # %
North 39 156 57.4%
Centre 10 40 14.7%
South 19 76 27.9%
Total 68 272 100%
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Table 2: Italian water service utilities, characteristics of the clusters based on ownership, size
and geographical locationa
Variables Categories
Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 Cluster 4 Cluster 5
# % # % # % # % # %
Ownership
Publicly owned utili-
ties
13 100% 0 0% 11 100% 0 0% 8 44%
Privately owned util-
ities
0 0% 2 13% 0 0% 10 91% 3 17%
Mixed owned utili-
ties with public or-
ganisation that owns
50% or more
0 0% 6 40% 0 0% 1 9% 5 28%
Mixed owned utili-
ties with private or-
ganisation that owns
50% or more
0 0% 2 13% 0 0% 0 0% 1 6%
Privately owned util-
ities with public or-
ganisation as main
indirect shareholders
0 0% 5 33% 0 0% 0 0% 1 6%
Size
Small 3 23% 0 0% 0 0% 11 100% 18 100%
Medium 7 54% 15 100% 11 100% 0 0% 0 0%
Large 3 23% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Geographical location
Northern Italy 1 8% 9 60% 11 100% 0 0% 18 100%
Central Italy 5 38% 5 33% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0%
Southern Italy 7 54% 1 7% 0 0% 11 100% 0 0%
# of utilities in the cluster 13 100% 15 100% 11 100% 11 100% 18 100%
a We conducted a χ2-test in order to assign the variables to the clusters. For all the variables the test was significant
(5%), except for the type of ownership #4 (mixed owned utilities with private organisation that owns 50% or
more).
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Table 3: Description of the clusters
Cluster Description
# of firms in the
cluster
% of the total
number of firms
Cluster 1 Publicly owned, medium-large, in Central-Southern Italy 13 19%
Cluster 2 Mixed owned with both direct and indirect main public organisation as shareholder 15 22%
Cluster 3 Publicly owned, medium, in Northern Italy 11 16%
Cluster 4 Privately owned, small, in Southern Italy 11 16%
Cluster 5 Publicly owned and mixed owned utilities, small, in Northern Italy 18 26%
Total 68 100%
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Table 4: Definition of inputs and outputs
Variable Variable name Description
Output
y1 Total revenue Accrued revenue recorded in the income statement
Inputs
x1 Cost of materials Accrued cost of raw material recorded in the income statement
x2 Cost of labour Accrued cost of labor recorded in the income statement
x3 Cost of services Accrued cost of services recorded in the income statement
x4 Cost of leases Accrued cost of rented asset and in operating leasing recorded in the income statement
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Table 5: Italian water service utilities, descriptive statistics for inputs and
outputsa
Year Variable Mean Std. dev. Median Skewness Kurtosis
Year 2011
y1 10,121,335 16,988,394 2,348,111 2.7 8.5
x1 1,083,785 3,111,111 193,655 6.4 45.2
x2 1,738,548 3,050,778 446,292 2.9 9.5
x3 4,405,616 7,292,794 1,016,890 2.3 5.1
x4 1,215,181 5,526,878 56,840 7.4 55.7
Year 2010
y1 10,043,699 17,009,684 2,403,003 2.9 10.4
x1 1,078,828 2,853,741 214,342 6.0 40.5
x2 1,645,831 2,794,543 500,416 3.1 12.1
x3 4,027,370 6,293,973 973,705 2.1 4.5
x4 655,829 1,302,237 37,137 2.2 3.6
Year 2009
y1 10,024,592 16,372,146 2,776,805 2.5 7.4
x1 1,006,826 2,778,297 219,541 6.1 42.1
x2 1,751,179 3,107,051 527,256 3.2 12.2
x3 4,298,332 6,879,418 966,142 2.2 4.7
x4 674,433 1,408,328 29,394 2.4 4.5
Year 2008
y1 9,674,737 16,020,107 3,014,006 2.7 8.2
x1 1,061,385 3,181,462 202,686 6.6 47.2
x2 1,714,371 3,172,536 473,426 3.5 14.9
x3 4,354,073 7,209,273 1,060,797 2.3 5.0
x4 676,034 1,443,635 32,759 2.5 5.7
a In thousands of e.
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Table 6: DEA efficiency scores for Italian water service utilities, distribution according to own-
ership, size and geographical location
Classification Group Mean 1st quartile Median 3rd quartile Std.dev. % efficient firms
Ownership
Type 1 0.6567 0.3149 0.7587 1.0000 0.3404 26.56
Type 2 0.4919 0.1532 0.4899 0.8770 0.3634 21.67
Type 3 0.6397 0.2076 0.7183 1.0000 0.3781 39.58
Type 4 0.5774 0.2890 0.5375 0.8670 0.3033 16.67
Type 5 0.9042 0.8035 0.9778 1.0000 0.1224 41.67
Size
Small 0.4572 0.1416 0.2930 0.7944 0.3584 17.97
Medium 0.7818 0.6717 0.8737 1.0000 0.2656 36.36
Large 0.9311 0.8871 1.0000 1.0000 0.1196 58.33
Geography
North 0.6371 0.2451 0.7382 1.0000 0.3483 28.21
Centre 0.7115 0.4676 0.9037 1.0000 0.3651 35.00
South 0.5929 0.2073 0.6001 1.0000 0.3518 26.32
Total 0.6357 0.2451 0.7478 1.0000 0.3524 28.68
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Table 7: DEA efficiency scores for Italian water service utilities, distribution according to clus-
ters
Classification Group Mean 1st quartile Median 3rd quartile Std.dev. % efficient firms
Clusters
Cluster 1 0.6366 0.3786 0.7589 0.9142 0.3407 19.23
Cluster 2 0.8129 0.7198 0.9399 1.0000 0.2555 41.67
Cluster 3 0.8626 0.7514 0.9716 1.0000 0.1862 47.73
Cluster 4 0.5161 0.1532 0.5278 0.9687 0.3729 25.00
Cluster 5 0.4216 0.1423 0.2493 0.6648 0.3425 15.28
Total 0.6357 0.2451 0.7478 1.0000 0.3524 28.68
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Table 8: Testing the closeness between unconditioned and conditioned relative efficiency series
(Li, 1996)
DEA
Null hypothesis T-statistic p-value
H0 : f (Unconditioned) = g(Ownership-conditioned) 2.1631 0.0153
H0 : f (Unconditioned) = g(Size-conditioned) 26.1374 0.0000
H0 : f (Unconditioned) = g(Geographical location-conditioned) –1.0027 0.8420
H0 : f (Unconditioned) = g(Combined effect) 22.5473 0.0000
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Figure 1: Kernel density plots of the unconditioned vs. conditioned efficiencies, DEA
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Notes: All figures contain densities estimated using kernel smoothing for unconditioned and conditioned
DEA efficiency scores. The vertical lines in each plot represent the average for all series, since we divide by the
corresponding (group) mean. A Gaussian kernel and the Sheather and Jones (1991) plug-in bandwidth were
chosen.
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